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THE PROSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS FRAUD
STEPHEN SENN*
The first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
religious freedom of individuals through its establishment and free
exercise clauses. Should the government's hands-off policy under
the free exercise clause provide a protective blanket for fraudulent
moneymaking schemes carried out in the name of religion? The
author of this Article argues that protection of religious freedom
can comfortably coexist with protection from religious fraud where
courts employ a "sincerity test.'" He concludes that with
appropriate procedural safeguards, courts can use this test to
distinguish sincere religious exercise from criminally fraudulent
enterprise.
T HE QUESTION of how to calibrate the balance of power be-
tween the state and the individual is most bluntly presented when
the state imposes criminal sanctions against an individual for doing
that which the individual claims to have a right to do.'
The resulting conflict presents the issue of whether the state is act-
ing legitimately, or from a different perspective, whether the indivi-
dual's activity is constitutionally protected. In the area of religious
liberty, the free exercise clause of the first amendment2 expressly
provides that in conflicts with the government, the individual is to
have the upper hand.
This Article focuses on the criminal prosecution of religious fraud,
arguing that those who commit the types of fraud discussed below
merit no constitutional protection3 and should be prosecuted under a
neutral application of the criminal fraud laws. 4 The risk of punishing
individuals who should be protected necessitates heightened proce-
* Law Clerk to the Hon. William J. Castagna, United States District Judge for the Mid-
dle District of Florida; B.S., 1986, Florida State University; J.D., 1989, Florida State University.
1. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) ("In [criminal] cases, to make
accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly
delicate task, because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of
either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.") (citation omitted).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ").
3. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
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dural safeguards, however.5 This Article contends that the key to
prosecution without persecution is accuracy in determining whether
the religious beliefs of the accused are sincerely held.
I. THE REVEREND DODGER: A HYPOTHETICAL
Imagine the following hypothetical: Mr. Dodger, an aspiring con-
fidence person, 6 is contemplating the script of his first major swin-
dle. His thoughts are guided by two primary concerns: high
profitability and minimal risk of criminal prosecution-rational con-
cerns of the utilitarian criminal mind. Dodger considers and rejects a
Ponzi scheme 7 a real estate scam and an AIDS "cure" because of
the high risk of prosecution.
Still searching for a scam, Dodger absent-mindedly switches from
station to station with his television remote control. At the high end
of the cable spectrum, a well-dressed gentleman relates his most re-
cent conversation with God. Just that morning at 4:00 a.m., says this
gentleman, he was awakened by a voice with an important new plan
for humanity. Upset by the unfortunate lack of faith in the world,
God had come to him with a plan to restore faith to the world.
God's plan, the gentleman continues, is to generously reward the
truly faithful, once they have adequately demonstrated their faith. A
person with faith will believe that the faithful shall be rewarded. To
obtain God's reward, the person need only provide God with ade-
quate evidence of faith. That evidence consists of sending one hun-
5. See infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
6. Similarities between the character Dodger and real persons are unfortunate but neces-
sary. In fact, the suspicion that there may be many such individuals was the primary motivation
for this Article. Discussion of hypotheticals not reflecting reality would seem largely a waste of
time. In researching this Article, I have spent a good bit of time watching religious programming
on television, and have also received a great deal of solicitation literature from one particular
televangelist. However, nothing in this Article should be read as an accusation of criminal activ-
ity against any individual.
7. The Fifth Circuit has provided the following description of a Ponzi scheme:
In a Ponzi scheme, a swindler promises a large return for investments made with him.
The swindler actually pays the promised returns on the initial investment in order to
attract additional investors. The payments are not financed through the success of the
underlying venture, but are taken from the corpus of the newly attracted investments.
The swindler then takes an appropriate time to abscond with the outstanding invest-
ments. As one author has described it, "he borrowed from Peter to pay Paul. And it
worked . . . until Paul got wise."
United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 282 n.3 (5th Cir.) (quoting unnamed author), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 836 (1978); cf. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ponzi scheme
within a religious scam).
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dred dollars to this gentleman, who has selflessly and gladly offered
his services to help the Lord carry out His new plan for humanity.
Dodger is impressed. He has seen press accounts of religious lead-
ers who have built incredible financial empires,' but he has never
considered such a line of work for himself. Thinking the matter
over, however, he decides it to be quite a good scam. The potential
for profit seems enormous, 9 and Dodger cannot recall anyone having
been prosecuted for this sort of thing.l0 As his swindle, he decides to
attempt to persuade everyone with whom he can communicate, by
whatever medium, that God wishes them to send money to him, the
Reverend Dodger.
Whether Dodger proceeds as a mainstream protestant evangelist or
as the oddly-garbed high prophet of a bizarre new cult is only tan-
gentially relevant to the constitutional arguments presented below.
The important point is that no sincere religious belief motivates Mr.
Dodger's actions. His sole motivation is the hope of making money.
8. For a recent documentation of the vast amounts of money raised by religious leaders,
see Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Reli-
gious Solicitation, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 441 (1988). Each year, an estimated two billion tax-
deductible dollars go to religious fundraisers. Id. at 443. While this estimate is necessarily little
more than a rough guess given the many local television and radio ministries, the top five tele-
vangelists alone raise over $500 million annually. Id. at 443 n.7.
The most noteworthy update to Turley's article is found in In re Heritage Village Church, 92
Bankr. 1000 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (detailing the financial misdealings of James Bakker and his
associates in their leadership of the Praise the Lord (PTL) ministry). Judge Rufus W. Reynolds'
opinion provides a chart of the bonuses paid to PTL executives in the nine months before James
Bakker's resignation from the ministry. During this nine-month period Tammy Faye Bakker
received $335,000, David Taggart (vice-president of PTL and administrative assistant to Mr.
Bakker) received $493,700, Richard Dortch (chief operation officer of PTL) received $453,010,
and James Bakker (president and chair of the board of directors of PTL) received $2,229,305.
Id. at 1004.
9. See Turley, supra note 8; see also Comment, Televangelism and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission: To Regulate or Retreat, 91 DIcK. L. REv. 553, 556-58 (1986).
10. Prosecutions for religious fraud are rare but do occur. See United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1157 (1982); Jeffers v. United States, 392 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1968).
A 24-count indictment against James Bakker and Richard Dortch of the PTL was issued on
Dec. 5, 1988. Marcus, Jim Bakker, Former Aides Are Indicted In PTL Case, Wash. Post, Dec.
6, 1988, at Al, col. 3; Smothers, Bakker And Ex-Aide Are Charged With Defrauding Donors To
PTL, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 4. Mr. Dortch entered a plea agreement admitting to
one count each of wire fraud and conspiracy. Following his plea for mercy, United States Dis-
trict Judge Robert Potter sentenced him to eight years in prison and a $200,000 fine. Patterson,
Dortch gets 8 years in PTL case, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at A7, col. 1. On Oct. 24,
1989, Judge Potter sentenced Bakker to 45 years in prison and fined him $500,000. Schmich,
Bakker gets 45 years and a fine of $500,000, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1989 at Al. Mr. Bak-
ker's trial was well-covered by the media, which may help reduce the number of Dodgers in the
future. See, e.g., Grimm, A torn ministry, and its leader, on trial, Miami Herald, Aug. 27, 1989,
at A1, col. 1.
328 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:325
II. RELIGIOUS FRAUD Is NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Dodger's plan clearly falls within the letter of the various criminal
statutes prohibiting fraud."1 To implement his plan, Dodger will
make innumerable false claims of his own faith and of the com-
mands of God with the specific intent to defraud others. These facts
meet the required elements of fraud, 12 and since Dodger will almost
certainly use the U.S. Postal Service to solicit funds, he will also vio-
late the federal mail fraud statute.
3
If Dodger also makes fraudulent claims of objectively secular fact,
such as "All money raised will go to feed hungry children," but the
money instead goes only to Dodger's pocket, prosecuting his case is
much easier, as little room would exist for a claim of constitutional
protection.14 Fraudulent claims of secular fact would clearly constitute
unprotected fraud despite the religious context. These claims therefore
would not be nearly as close to receiving constitutional protection as
would fraudulent claims of religious belief. This Article gives the
Dodgers of the world sufficient credit not to make fraudulent secular
claims which may be embarrassingly disproved.I5
II. See FLA. STAT. § 817.034 (3)(d) (1987) ('Scheme to defraud' means a systematic, ongo-
ing course of conduct with intent to obtain property from one or more persons by false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises or willful misrepresentations of a future
act."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (1989) ("Communications fraud" defined as "any
scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of
value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omis-
sions" in which the defrauder "communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice.").
12. See id. Dodger's moneymaking scheme involves false pretenses, false representations,
and false promises.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ("Nothing we have said is
intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,
commit frauds upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct.");
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) ("[Flraudulent appeals may be made in the name of
charity and religion . . . [and] may be denounced as offenses and punished by law.").
Courts have almost uniformly allowed actions against fraudulent assertions regarding secular
matters despite the religious context. See United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393 (4th Cir.
1985), cerl. denied, 474 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1983);
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Carruthers,
152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946); People v. Le Grande, 309 N.Y.
420, 131 N.E.2d 712 (1956).
Even Justice Jackson, who in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), argued for an
outright prohibition of fraud charges based on lack of sincere religious belief, would allow crim-
inal prosecution of one "making false representations on matters other than faith or experience,
as for example if one represents that funds are being used to construct a church when in fact
they are being used for personal purposes." Id. at 95 (Jackson, J., concurring). For a discussion
of Ballard, see infra text accompanying notes 31-41.
15. This should not suggest that prosecutors have been eager to bring charges against even
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Although the laws prohibiting fraud clearly apply to Dodger, prose-
cution of any type of fraud in the religious context is uncommon.1 6
Although this rarity of prosecution may be due to the uniform law
abiding behavior of religious leaders, it seems more likely that prose-
cutors are simply hesitant to bring such suits. 7 To the extent that this
hesitancy exists, it grants a de facto exemption from prosecution to
those who perpetrate fraud on persons genuinely in search of spiritual
guidance. Such an exemption creates a malevolent gap in the protec-
tions a state owes its citizens,"8 and is contrary to the wise policies
underlying the religion clauses of the first amendment. 9
A. The Victims
Although it is an unfortunately disparaging analogy, some insight
on religious fraud may be found in the Marxist comparison of religion
to opium.20 Religious faith serves to ease the pain and emptiness of
this type of constitutionally unproblematic fraud. See Turley, supra note 8, at 461-63 (docu-
menting several allegations of this type of fraud which have not been prosecuted).
16. See supra note 10.
17. See Panel Discussion, Regulation of Alternative Religions By Law or Private Action:
Can and Should We Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 118 (1980). Professor
Nathan Dershowitz commented:
Today there is no neutral application of law when it comes to religion. The law simply
is not applied at all. When you say, therefore, "Let's apply the criminal law to these
groups," it is a waste of time because it simply is not being done. If you saw some-
body being kidnapped off the streets of New York City and you went up to a police
officer and said, "That person was kidnapped by the Unification Church," the cop
simply would not go after him. Now, that is what I think is part of the problem. The
minute law enforcement officers are told a religious group is involved, they refuse to
act. If you go into court, and claim that the activities that are engaged in by this group
are the same as those of the Mafia, the difference in the application of the law is clear.
I went down to Congress about a year and a half ago (before Jonestown) and the
Congressmen just were not interested -at all in certain kinds of problems. As to what
was happening in religion, they simply did not want to get involved.
What I am looking for is this neutral application of law which would require that
religious groups have certain things investigated. I don't want to use religion as a
shield that will allow these groups to engage in certain gross criminal activities; I think
that is what is happening today. Certain gross criminal activities are being engaged in,
and we are afraid to investigate because we say it is religion. That cannot be justified
in terms of the first amendment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The FCC has also been criticized for its failure to enforce the law against religious program-
mers. See Comment, supra note 9, at 558-74.
18. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 232, 241, 163 P.2d 704, 714 (1945)
("The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who
seek for one purpose or another to obtain its money.").
19. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
20. K. MARx, Introduction, Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right (1844), in THa
MARx-EN ELS READER 12 (R. Tucker ed. 1972) ("Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature,
the feeling of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of
the people.").
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many in our society, and the more bleak one's life, the more desperate
the search for solace. Just as many turn to chemical sedation to escape
a dismal reality, many others cope with the travails of this world by
directing their attention to the next. Thus, those who most need the
salve of religion become the easiest marks for Dodger, who begins his
first radio sermon with that knowledge in mind. It starts like this:
The Lord has sent me here today to speak to you-especially those
of you who have problems so overwhelming that you almost can't
cope. Demons surround you and have torn your lives apart so that
you suffer pain greater than anyone should bear alone. I've come to
tell you that you are not alone. The Lord knows of your pain and
problems. He has shown you to me, and has commanded me to help
you. The Lord has shown me a good, hard-working woman out there
listening today who has been beaten and abused by her husband. She
is too afraid to turn to anyone for help. I see, too, a blind man who
worked with his hands to support himself for many years. This man
is now tortured with arthritis. I see the mother of a very sick little
boy; she is worried about the lack of money for medical care .... 1
Dodger continues to "see" other unfortunate characters derived from
his imagination and his common sense understanding of the demo-
graphics of sorrow. The Reverend Dodger is calling to his flock.
This premise-that those whose current reality is more akin to hell
will search the most urgently for paradise on earth-is even more rele-
vant when considered in conjunction with the nature of the relation-
ship between religious leaders and their followers. While much of the
recent literature on this subject has focused on the extremely rigid
controls allegedly employed by some of the newer religions,2 nearly
all religious organizations are hierarchical entities in which a central
figure proffers spiritual guidance and solicits the dependence and trust
of those looking to that figure for spiritual leadership. The nature of
the pastor-church member relationship merits some level of state su-
pervision in order to deter unscrupulous religious leaders-who have
power to exert inordinate influence over others and who tend to be
21. This is a standard formula of one televangelist who shall remain unnamed. See supra
note 6; cf. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 437 (2d
Cir. 1981) ("Devotees also on occasion 'targeted' their contributors, approaching those most
likely to succumb to the pressure to contribute-young couples with small children, teenagers,
handicapped individuals, and groups of retarded persons."). For a study of the demographics of
the televangelism audience, see Comment, supra note 9, at 555-56.
22. E.g., Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons and the Protection of Religious Belief, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1277 (1982-1983).
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trusted without question-from unfairly and illegally using that influ-
ence to the detriment of others.23
Religious fraud, like medical fraud, often poses the greatest threat
to those already under great emotional, financial, and/or physical
stress. Moreover, these persons are defrauded by someone in whom
they have placed confidence and trust, and to whom they have turned
for guidance. The state's failure to prosecute religious fraud denies
protection to those who need it the most.2 4
B. The Effect of Religious Fraud on Religion
Although current case law provides little support for any argument
that a de facto exemption for religious fraud is an impermissible es-
tablishment of religion, ' 5 the policies underlying the religion clauses
are relevant. In Engle v. Vitale,26 the Court recognized that "a union
23. Pastor Carl Stevens was able to exploit such a position of trust in order to gain an
overmastering power over Elizabeth Dovydenas, who later successfully sued for restitution on
the basis of undue influence. See In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987),
aff'd, 81 Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
24. Of course, the upper classes are neither immune to, nor too smart to be taken in by, this
type of crime. For example, Elizabeth Dovydenas was a 34-year-old college graduate worth $19
million when she fell under the spell of Pastor Carl Stevens. Id. at 850. Financially secure vic-
tims, however, are better able, at least financially, to rectify the situation once they realize they
have been defrauded.
One may question whether victims of religious fraud do in fact suffer harm. If the victims
believe they benefit themselves or others by sending money to Dodger, have they indeed been
wronged? The reply is that they have been harmed just as surely as has a person who buys
ostensibly genuine diamonds which turn out to be glass. Both victims give their money to a
wrongdoer; their acts are grounded in belief that the fraudulent statements were, in fact, true.
But for these lies, they would not have given their money. The "diamond" buyer may never
discover the swindle, but a crime has nonetheless occurred. Dodger's victims experience a very
real monetary loss and have, in good faith, relied upon factual misrepresentations as to Dodger's
state of mind. No legal reason justifies a finding that this factual misrepresentation is any differ-
ent than the factual misrepresentation of the glass as diamonds.
25. As an initial matter, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to surprisingly
little judicial supervision. See, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229-30
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984). Even if a policy of nonprosecution of religious
fraud could be demonstrated, the rationale of cases allowing states to reasonably accommodate
religious practices would probably allow such a policy. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 453 (1971); Walz
v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
These cases demonstrate the judicial rejection of the "neutral principles" approach upon which
any establishment clause argument would be based. See generally P. KuR.AND, RELIGION AND
THE LAW (1962) (arguing that the constitution requires that religious groups be treated precisely
the same as other groups). But see Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1983)
(suggesting that the Federal Communications Commission is constitutionally obligated to inves-
tigate allegations of fraud by religious broadcasters as readily as allegations against other licens-
ees), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
26. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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of government and religion tends to destroy government and to de-
grade religion." ' 27 In this context, turning a blind eye to religious fraud
can only result in the worst degradations of religion. Rational utilitar-
ian criminals would be foolish to choose anything other than a reli-
gious scam, and may reasonably be expected to flock to this low-risk,
high-profit variety of crime. One court reasoned that "the way of the
confidence man would be easy if he could obtain money from the re-
ligious by willfully false protestations of belief and then, when
brought to book, take refuge in the first amendment. ' 2 If the first
amendment does provide such refuge, then the only surprising thing
about the recent scandals involving American religious figures is that
more have not come to light. 29
The risk of further corrupting American religion, coupled with the
need to protect society from unscrupulous, parasitic wrongdoers, mili-
tates strongly against allowing religious fraud to pass unpunished.
However, the real threat that criminal prosecution of religious fraud
may mask religious persecution of those who merit the protection of
the free exercise clause must also be considered. In fact, some have
argued that the risk of prosecution as persecution may be so great as
to make the de facto exemption that this Article condemns a matter of
constitutional necessity.30
27. Id. at 431.
28. Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1962).
29. One commentator points out:
With Americans spending an estimated $74 billion annually on charities worldwide,
finding God can make extraordinarily good financial sense. State and federal officials
readily admit that religious fraud is both profitable and virtually risk (and tax) free.
"If I were a con man and wanted to make a lot of money," a California state official
remarked, "I'd set up [a] scam and call it religion. Then nobody can look at my
books, and if people say I'm a crook, I'd just say, 'Stay out of my business; you're
violating my rights under the First Amendment!"'
Turley, supra note 8, at 448 (quoting an unidentified California Deputy Attorney General) (foot-
notes omitted); see also Rakay & Sugarman, A Reconsideration of the Religious Exemption: The
Need for Financial Disclosure of Religious Fund Raising and Solicitation Practices, 9 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 863, 889-90 (1978).
30. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Prosecu-
tions of this character easily could degenerate into religious persecution."). Commentators have
generally supported this view. See, e.g., Heins, "Other People's Faiths": The Scientology Liti-
gation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTNGs Co sT. L.Q. 153, 165 (1981). Heins
does, however, recognize the societal costs that would flow from Justice Jackson's rule:
The rejection of a sincerity test in religious fraud cases may well mean that classic
charlatans, if they are careful to maintain a front of coherent religious doctrine and
religious context when purveying their views, will continue, unabated by civil or crimi-
nal liability, to relieve spiritually impoverished or vulnerable Americans of substantial
funds or even to impel them to alter their lives radically. The rule of religious caveat
emptor is proper, however, because the First Amendment imports it into our Consti-
tutional law.
Id. at 189.
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III. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS FRAUD
United States v. Ballard31 is the only case which has presented the
Supreme Court with a criminal prosecution of religious fraud. Guy,
Edna, and Douglas Ballard were leaders of the "I am" movement;
their teachings included claims that Guy was the divine messenger of
Saint Germain, that Guy had spoken with Jesus and would pass on
His message to humanity, and that all three had various supernatural
powers, including the power to heal.12 These claims formed the basis
of a mail fraud prosecution against Edna and Douglas.33
It is important to note that the Court expressly characterized the
allegedly fraudulent statements as involving "respondents' alleged re-
ligious doctrines of belief."3 4 Ballard does not involve objectively de-
monstrable falsehoods, such as false promises to use money raised for
a certain purpose." The Ballards were smart enough (as is the Rever-
end Dodger) to avoid making such easily disproved claims.
The trial judge instructed the jury not to examine the truth or fal-
sity of the Ballards' claimed religious belief, but rather to determine
only whether the defendants sincerely believed their claims; if the jury
determined that the Ballards sincerely believed their claims, the jury
was required to find the Ballards innocent.3 6 Justice Douglas' majority
opinion held that the trial judge acted properly in not allowing the
jury to examine the verity of the Ballards' doctrines.3 7 He wrote:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible,
if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are
subject to a trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any
sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a
forbidden domain. 38
31. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
32. Id. at 79-80.
33. Guy Ballard died before the charges were brought. Id. at 79.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
36. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81-82.
37. Judge Denman of the Ninth Circuit would have given the Ballards an opportunity to
prove that they actually spoke with Jesus and Saint Germain. See Ballard v. United States, 138
F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1943) (Denman, J., concurring), rev'd, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Of Judge
Denman's view, one commentator has written: "It is difficult to say whether or not [the concur-
ring opinion] was written with tongue in cheek." Heins, supra note 30, at 162 n.40.
38. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87. Inviting others to look at the issue from the perspective of
potential criminal defendants, Justice Douglas also wrote:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some
may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of
1990]
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The Court thus rejected the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the truth of
religious claims may go to the jury;3 9 however, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Ballard does not expressly sanction the trial court's basing a
conviction on lack of sincerity.40 This and other questions were re-
manded to the Ninth Circuit.4 ' As the Court has yet to reexamine the
area of religious fraud, no definitive statement as to whether insincer-
ity is an appropriate basis for a religious fraud conviction has been
made.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet placed its imprimatur on
religious sincerity testing in criminal religious fraud cases, lower
courts have adopted this position. 42 Moreover, courts have applied
sincerity review in free exercise cases in a variety of noncriminal con-
texts. These include cases examining whether to grant a tax exemp-
tion, 43 an exemption from school immunization programs, 44 or
protection of prisoners' religious practices. 4 Other cases addressing
mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law. Many take their
gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be
tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings con-
tained false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of
Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.
Id. at 86-87.
39. Ballard v. United States, 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
40. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1142 n.16 (D.Mass.
1982); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 229, 644 P.2d 577, 604 (Ct.
App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); Heins, supra note 30, at 163 & n.46;
Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion " in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 599 (1964).
41. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1022 (1986); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1157 (1982); New v. United States, 245 F. 710, 712 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S.
665 (1917).
43. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989); Ideal Life Church of
Lake Elmo v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (Wahl, J., concur-
ring); Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d
512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982); see also Note, The Role of Church and State in
Determining Religious Purposes: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christi-
anity v. Tax Comm'n, 16 CONN. L. REv. 71, 83-87 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Role of Church and
State].
44. See, e.g., Mason v. General Brown Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988);
Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94-97 (E.D.N.Y.
1987).
45. See, e.g., Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984); Childs v. Duckworth, 705
F.2d 915, 921 (7th Cir. 1983); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981);
Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayer's Money in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981); Loney v.
Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979); Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978).
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religious sincerity include actions for unemployment benefits,4 defa-
mation,47 child support, 4 contempt of court, 49 and civil fraud. 0
Ballard is commonly cited as precedent for sincerity testing-even
by the Supreme Court.' The widespread approval of sincerity testing
evidenced by these civil cases indicates that determining religious sin-
cerity is within the judicial competence. This approval is also strong
authority for application of sincerity testing in the criminal context.
5 2
Moreover, unless courts adopt the outright ban on prosecution of
religious fraud that Justice Jackson advocated in his Ballard dissent,53
sincerity testing seems to be the only constitutionally sound method of
conviction. 4 A ban on the prosecution of religious fraud would be
undesirable, for several reasons discussed above.55 And in any case,
why should Dodger be allowed a free exercise defense to a fraud pros-
ecution? Sincerity testing, if accurately employed, results in no in-
fringement of religious conduct or belief. Persons convicted of
religious fraud have no cognizable complaint that their religious free-
dom was violated, where the court accurately finds that they have no
sincere religious belief. Sham claims of religious faith are not entitled
to first amendment protection. 6
46. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517-18 (1989).
47. See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
48. See In re Marriage of Hoyt, 742 P.2d 963, 964 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
49. See In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
50. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1142-45 (D. Mass. 1982).
51. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989). The Court has previously cited
Ballard for the inconsistent proposition that the constitutionality of sincerity examination re-
mains undecided. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); see also Heins, supra note
30, at 182-89.
52. But see generally Heins, supra note 30.
53. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
54. See United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 938 n.49 (D.C.Cir. 1983) ("Sincerity can be
the only test, for any inquiry into the truth or falsity of beliefs is barred by the first amend-
ment.").
55. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
56. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989); Patrick v. Le
Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[B]elief must be sincerely held and religious in nature
to be accorded first amendment protection."); Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 921 (7th Cir.
1983) ("The exercise of beliefs, insincerely held, cannot be used as a masquerade to hold meet-
ings presumably protected by the First Amendment."); International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160, 1165 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); see also
L. TRIBE, AmaERIc CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12 (2d ed. 1988); Note, Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1258, 1271-72 (1989) [herein-
after Note, Burdens on Free Exercise].
In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965), the Court recognized that "while the
'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question of whether it is
'truly held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is,
of course, a question of fact .... "
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A remaining argument in support of Justice Jackson's recom-
mended ban is that such a ban is necessary to avoid the risk of an
erroneous finding of insincerity-that is, an outright ban is necessary
to give religious practitioners some of the same "breathing space '" 7
that free speech practitioners enjoy.5" A criminal conviction based on
an erroneous finding of religious insincerity would indeed work a sub-
stantial violation of the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Pulling in the other direction, however, are the immeasurable costs
which would flow from failing to prosecute religious fraud.59 Thus it
is appropriate to critically examine how the courts may employ sin-
cerity testing and how, in prosecuting religious fraud, procedures
should be improved in order to lower the risk of error to a constitu-
tionally acceptable level.
IV. THE MECHANICS OF PROSECUTING RELIGIOUS FRAUD
A defendant's state of mind is as much a question of fact as any
other type of factual determination a judge or jury must routinely
make. 60 However, since the fact finder is incapable of peering into
another's head to discover what lies therein, a defendant's state of
mind is rarely capable of being proved by direct evidence. 61 For this
reason, courts have readily allowed proof of mental state by indirect
or circumstantial evidence. 62
As discussed above, however, whether the first amendment pro-
tects a religious fraud defendant depends on the outcome of this
mental state determination. From this fact flow fundamental consti-
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
58. Heins, supra note 30, at 166-67.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 18-29.
60. See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, L.R. 29 Ch. D. 459 (1885) (Lord Bowen). The court
stated:
[Tihe state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true
that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is,
but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as
to the state of a man's mind is, therefore, a misstatement of fact.
Id. at 483.
61. United States v. Prince, 496 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107
(1975). The difficulty of proving a defendant's insincerity will thus often be the cornerstone of
the defense. Defense counsel must stress to the jury that the prosecution has the burden of prov-
ing mens rea to defraud and, consequently, has the burden of disproving that the defendant was
instead motivated by religious belief. See, e.g., Orrick, Attorneys say Bakker betrayed, Tampa
Tribune, Aug. 29, 1989, at A2, col. 6 ("Again and again [defense counsel] said the government
will be unable to prove any criminal intent on Bakker's part.").
62. Castle v. Bullard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 172, 187 (1859); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d
1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1062 (1985); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); Prince, 496 F.2d at 1293.
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tutional safeguards. 63 Accordingly, the constitution should similarly
guide the procedures by which the defendant's mental state is deter-
mined, thereby insuring that those who merit constitutional protec-
tion are not denied it by an incorrect finding of insincerity. Courts
have routinely indicated that the determination of religious sincerity
is a sensitive undertaking64 warranting extraordinary caution. 65 The
exercise of such caution must begin in the trial court and continue
through appeal.
A. Responsibilities of the Trial Judge
In light of Ballard, the trial judge must not allow the search for
sincerity to become a trial on the verity of the defendant's claimed
religious tenets. Admission of improper evidence and inappropriate
prosecutorial comment are the primary threats to a fair trial on reli-
gious sincerity. In the Ballard trial, for example, the prosecutor com-
pared the "ascended masters" of the "I am" movement to comic
book characters." Any such attempt by the prosecutor to ridicule or
question the religious principles claimed by the defendant not only di-
rects the jury's attention to the nonjusticiable issue of religious verity,
but also panders to any majoritarian bias in the jury against a defend-
ant claiming a nontraditional faith.
This risk of juror bias,67 especially against newer and more unusual faiths,61
63. See supra notes 52-56.
64. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989); Patrick
v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1984); Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free
School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
65. See Jeffers v. United States, 392 F.2d 749, 752-53 (9th Cir. 1968); Sherr, 672 F. Supp.
at 94; Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1144-45 (D. Mass. 1982); see
also L. TRIE, supra note 56, § 14-12; Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on
the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 953-55 (1989); Note, Role of Church and
State, supra note 43, at 83-87; Note, Burdens on Free Exercise, supra note 56, at 1271-72.
66. Weiss, supra note 40, at 602 n.36, (citing Record, vol. 1, at 1211, 1237, 1503, United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)); see also Heins, supra note 30, at 188 n.176.
67. Juror bias was one of Justice Jackson's primary concerns in his dissent in Ballard:
"When one comes to trial which turns on any aspect of religious belief or representation, unbe-
lievers among his judges are likely not to understand and are almost certain not to believe him."
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). "Prosecutions of this character easily
could degenerate into religious persecution." Id. at 95.
68. See Lupu, supra note 65, at 954 ("The more unusual a claimant's religion, the easier it
will be for decisionmakers to conclude, on the basis of an unarticulated view, that 'no one could
really believe this,' that the claimant's beliefs are not sincerely held."); Ogletree, Reverend
Moon and the Black Hebrews: Constitutional Protection of a Defendant's Religion in Criminal
Cases, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 191 (1987). Professor Ogletree suggests that religious dis-
crimination may be coupled with racial discrimination and notes that the Reverend Moon, dur-
ing his prosecution for tax evasion, claimed to be a victim of both. Id. at 212 n.108; see also
United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
971 (1984).
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as well as the risk of undue spectacle, 69 necessitates carefulness in
forming a jury for a religious fraud trial. 70 If the defendant reasonably
argues that no jury of laypersons would be competent to objectively
adjudicate sincerity, either because of pervasive prejudice against the
defendant or the faith, or because of particularly shocking religious
practices, the defendant should be granted a bench trial.7' Although
the Second Circuit has ruled that no right to a bench trial exists under
these circumstances, 72 its ruling has been persuasively criticized as fail-
ing to acknowledge the risk of religious persecution where an unpopu-
lar religious figure is brought before a jury. 73 The logic of Ballard,
that a potentially hostile jury should not be allowed to find a tenet of
faith false,7 4 should also apply to prohibit a jury trial of a religious
leader who reasonably fears juror bias against himself or his claimed
beliefs. 75 Protection from persecution lies at the heart of the religion
clauses, and our nation's role in providing a refuge from religious per-
secution figures prominently in determining the scope of constitu-
tional religious freedom. 76 Therefore, if the defendant can make any
reasonable showing of potential juror bias, the court should grant a
bench trial. Similarly, if a jury trial is held, the judge should give def-
erence to defense requests for for-cause dismissals. 77
69. See Jeffers, 392 F.2d at 753. The court stated:
[W]e reverse the convictions and direct the entry of judgment of acquittal on all
counts for the following reason: The spectacle presented to the jury-of a 67 year old
eccentric purporting to have psychic powers, and his attractive 27 year old wife betting
contributors' funds at the dog races-was so highly prejudicial that we cannot con-
clude that a fair trial was had ....
Id.
70. For example, in the prosecution of Reverend Moon, most of the jurors knew his name
and had a negative view of his activities. Ogletree, supra note 68, at 192 n.9 (citing juror respon-
ses to questions on voir dire); see also Lupu, supra note 65, at 957-58.
71. See Jeffers v. United States, 392 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1968) (determining that a jury
should not hear a case involving disreputable religious practices); see also Ogletree, supra note
68, at 210 ("In cases involving long-term, widespread religious prejudice, however, such as that
faced by Reverend Moon, waiver of a jury trial may be the only effective means available for
protecting a defendant's first amendment rights.") (footnote omitted). Moon exemplifies perva-
sive prejudice against the defendant and the religion. See Moon, 718 F.2d at 1210.
72. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1217-18.
73. See Ogletree, supra note 68, at 209-13.
74. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
75. Ogletree, supra note 68, at 209-13.
76. E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) ("Nothing but the most telling
of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears . . . could have planted
our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage.") (citation omitted);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) ("A large proportion of the early settlers of this
country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support
and attend government-favored churches.").
77. In Moon, the defendant's argument on appeal was weakened by the fact that his attor-
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In a jury trial, a judge may reduce the risk of erroneous conviction
by taking steps to assure that the jury focuses upon the crucial factor
of sincerity. Two procedures should help a judge attain this goal.
First, a judge's instructions should carefully limit the jury's inquiry to
religious sincerity. Jurors must be admonished to set aside their per-
sonal religious beliefs and opinions regarding the defendant's claimed
religion. 7 The jury instructions set out in Ballard are sufficient in
this regard. Second, a special verdict"' asking jurors whether the de-
fendant "honestly and in good faith believes the statements upon
which the fraud charges are based" would further reduce risks that
the jury might depart from its constitutional limits.8 '
Such procedures designed to minimize risk of error, combined with
ample evidence of insincerity, should reduce to an acceptable level the
danger of first amendment violation inherent in prosecuting alleged
religious hucksters.8 2 Note, however, that a demonstration of insincer-
ney had made no significant effort to challenge the seating of various jurors during voir dire.
United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1219 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
971 (1984). The court noted that failure to challenge is strong evidence that the defendant con-
sidered the jurors not biased, id., despite juror responses on voir dire, see supra note 70, and the
defendant's arguments on appeal that he should have been granted a bench trial. The trial judge
himself concluded that a bench trial would have been fairer for the Reverend Moon, noting on
the record that if his discretion were not limited in the matter, he would have granted a nonjury
trial. Ogletree, supra note 68, at 213 (citing Post-Trial Transcript at 26, Moon, 718 F.2d at
1210).
Because of the substantial weight the Second Circuit placed on the defense's failure to chal-
lenge jurors in Moon, defense counsel in cases involving similar facts should strenuously object
to all jurors appearing to be biased against the defendant or the religion. Where this is done, and
the denial of a bench trial is appealed, Moon will arguably be distinguishable.
78. Lupu, supra note 65, at 955.
79. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1944).
80. Cf. FED. R. CiuM. P. 31(c) (authorizing special verdicts).
81. In United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1157 (1982), the court recognized that the Constitution requires proof of insincerity for a
conviction of religious fraud, and consequently held that the jury must have made such a deter-
mination. The court did not review the jury questions, but merely noted that sufficient evidence
of deceit existed from which the jury could have found insincerity. Id. at 849. The court thereby
papered over the possibility that the jury did not clearly focus its attention on the sincerity issue.
Although the case record-which overwhelmingly indicated guilt-may have warranted the
court's disregard, a special verdict finding of insincerity would have made the conviction consid-
erably less suspect.
82. See In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr. 848, 869 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (recognizing
that a finding of insincerity may be a ploy by which to remove constitutional protection from a
defendant, but holding that there is no danger of this occurring where the evidence clearly indi-
cates insincerity), aff'd, 81 Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
Because the evidence of sincerity will generally be circumstantial, see supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text, a court may find special instructions on circumstantial evidence advisable.
Most states follow this procedure, but the federal courts do not; the modern trend appears to be
away from such instruction. See generally, Note, Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions Based
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ity requires that the factfinder draw inferences from circumstantial ev-
idence which often may be inconclusive.13 The sufficiency of the
evidence on the question of religious sincerity is of utmost importance
for two reasons. First, the state must disprove sincerity beyond all rea-
sonable doubt84 in order to prove the element of fraudulent intent.8 5
Second, because sincerity of belief determines whether the free exer-
cise clause protects the defendant,8 6 the sincerity finding takes on the
character of a "constitutional fact;" ' 87 therefore, the trial judge should
require a heightened evidentiary standard before allowing the jury to
decide the issue. 8  Motions for judgment of acquitta 89 should be
granted where the judge cannot conclude that the evidence reasonably
and to a high degree of certainty disproves religious sincerity. It may
also be advisable for purposes of appeal to require the judge to set
forth in writing the reasons for denying such a motion, specifying the
evidence which justifies allowing the question to go to the jury.
B. Review on Appeal
The usual appellate standard of review in criminal cases is to reverse
the lower court decision only if no reasonable juror could have found
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the government. 90 Unfortunately, this deferential stan-
dard has been applied in at least one religious fraud case. 91 Where a
criminal prosecution risks erroneous conviction within constitutionally
on Circumstantial Evidence, 6 VT. L. REv. 197 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Circumstantial Evi-
dence].
83. See Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1196 (S.D. Iowa 1979); see also infra text ac-
companying notes 97-158 (discussing types of evidence relevant to insincerity).
84. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
85. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 847-48.
86. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
87. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1964) (holding that the determination
whether a work is obscene is not a factual judgment for a jury, but is an issue of constitutional
law for the judge, which the appellate court must review de novo).
88. Lupu, supra note 65, at 955. Whether a claim is within the definition of religion is a
constitutional fact which should not be submitted to the jury. Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); cf. New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298-99 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting the risks
of leaving the application of constitutional rights to a jury's finding of a factual state of mind).
89. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
90. See United States v. Snowden, 770 F.2d 393, 397 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1011 (1986); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Stull,
743 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062 (1985).
91. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1157 (1982). Based on this appellate standard, if one reasonable juror could have found the
defendant guilty, the defendant loses on appeal. In light of first amendment protection and po-
tential for religious bias, the standard for reversing a religious fraud conviction should be less
onerous.
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protected zones, the appellate courts have been and should be more
generous in overturning questionable verdicts. 92
While a de novo review is probably unnecessary, 93 the regular stan-
dard is insufficient. In this context, sincerity acts as a constitutional
fact, 94 so the appellate court should examine the record closely to de-
termine whether sufficient evidence was introduced to make substan-
tially doubtful any claims of religious sincerity. 95 The types of
evidence which might be expected are discussed in the next section.
The appellate court should also be sensitive to any claims that the
trial court's factfinding process evinces flaws which could enhance the
risk of an erroneous finding of insincerity. Appellate courts must
scrupulously rule against improper evidence, improper argument, or
jury bias in cases on appeal to ensure that such problems are carefully
avoided in the trial courts. Adoption of the foregoing suggestions
should help reduce the risk of erroneous conviction to a constitution-
ally tolerable level.
V. EVIDENCE OF INSINCERITY
Numerous cases in a variety of contexts examine the issue of reli-
gious sincerity. 96 Types of evidence discussed in court opinions and
92. See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 172-73 (lst Cir. 1969) (holding that in
the area of first amendment free speech, evidence of intent for conspiracy must be judged stric-
tissimijuris); Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 682, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505-06 (Ct.
App. 1971) (holding that a stricter evidentiary standard is needed where speech is concerned).
93. The argument that a de novo review is required for appeal of a religious fraud judgment
has been rejected in a civil case, where the constitutional stakes are considerably lower. See The
Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 Bankr. 750, 757 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869
F.2d 628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
It appears that the district court in The Bible Speaks may have misread Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the primary authority cited by appellants, which clearly
states that in determining whether actual malice is present in a libel case, "[a]ppellate judges...
must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice
with convincing clarity." Id. at 514. The judge understood Bose Corp. to apply only to ques-
tions of law. The Bible Speaks, 81 Bankr. at 757-58. On appeal, the First Circuit ruled that Bose
Corp. was not applicable at all since Pastor Stevens' acts of undue influence were outside the
protection of the first amendment. In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 630 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
A de novo standard appears inappropriate because demeanor evidence, which the appellate
court is not competent to review, see Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 501-02, is so important in ascer-
taining sincerity, see infra note 126-28 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
95. A minority of jurisdictions have held that where a conviction is based solely on circum-
stantial evidence, which is often the case on the issue of insincerity, the appellate court should
reverse a conviction if it discovers a reasonable theory consistent with innocence. Note, Circum-
stantial Evidence, supra note 82, at 208. This standard easily extends to the religious fraud con-
text. The appellate court should simply ask whether the evidence, taken as a whole, is reasonably
consistent with sincere religious belief. If so, the prosecutor has failed to meet the burden of
proof.
96. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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legal literature include: (a) actions inconsistent with professed beliefs;
(b) the willingness to bear adverse consequences of the religious belief;
(c) an alternative secular purpose; (d) the size and history of the reli-
gious organization; (e) the extent to which the claimed beliefs parallel
traditional beliefs; (f) the intensity of the believer's devotion; (g) the
defendant's testimony and statements relevant to the defendant's re-
ligious sincerity; (h) whether the challenged tenet is part of an organ-
ized faith of which the defendant is a member; (i) the coexistence of
secular fraud; (j) previous case law on the defendant, the religious or-
ganization, or the religious belief; and (k) evidence of the defendant's
attempts to cover up embarrassing or questionable activities.
The following subsections will discuss these categories of evidence
and their strengths and weaknesses. While this evidentiary catalogue is
directed to determining sincerity in a trial for criminal fraud, it should
prove helpful in any case where the issue of sincerity is material. 97
A. Acts Inconsistent With Belief
Courts98 and commentators" seem most comfortable with a finding
of insincerity where the defendant's behavior is substantially inconsis-
97. Various noncriminal cases have dealt with the issue of religious fraud. See supra notes
43-50 and accompanying text.
98. See Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[A]n adher-
ent's belief would not be 'sincere' if he acts in a manner inconsistent with that belief . . .")
(quoting International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d
Cir. 1981)), aff'd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266, 271 (6th Cir.) (introducing
evidence that Christian religious leader used position to debauch young girls), cert. denied, 266
U.S. 617 (1924); New v. United States, 245 F. 710, 713 (9th Cir.) (allowing evidence that defen-
dant was "an habitual indulger in each and every of the sins and practices he pretended to
condemn"), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1917); Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free
School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing a defendant's testimony that "al-
though he opposed any 'intrusion' into the body on religious grounds, he had had [his son] X-
rayed when it was believed that the boy had broken his leg, allowed dentists to remove decay
from cavities his children might have, and had his [sons] circumcised."); In re The Bible Speaks,
73 Bankr. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (merchant claiming that scheduling his trial on Sabbath
violated free exercise rights was not entitled to rescheduling since evidence showed he regularly
did business on the Sabbath), aff'd, 81 Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194
A.2d 657, 659 (D.C. 1963).
99. Even scholars who argue for an outright ban on prosecution of religious fraud admit
that evidence of acts inconsistent with belief is "less constitutionally troublesome." Heins, supra
note 30, at 185; see also Lupu, supra note 65, at 954; Riga, Religion, Sincerity, and the Free
Exercise Clause, 25 CATH. LAW. 246, 260 (1980) ("Certainly the courts may accept extrinsic
evidence on inconsistent words and actions of the claimant by the government's own investiga-
tion and it would then be up to the claimant to explain them."); Note, Role of Church and
State, supra note 43, at 84; Note, Burdens on Free Exercise, supra note 56, at 1271-72; Note,
Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1081-82 (1978) [herein-
after Note, Constitutional Definition of Religion].
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tent with the requirements of the faith. Conversely, a showing that the
defendant's lifestyle generally comports with the particular religious
beliefs is strong evidence that the defendant sincerely holds these be-
liefs.' 00
However, two logical limitations on this type of evidence exist.
First, acts occurring before the defendant claims to have adopted the
belief will usually be irrelevant and should not be admitted. 10 True
conversions are possible, and those who claim a conversion should not
be held accountable for sins of the past. 102 Second, deviations from
belief must be sufficiently substantial, in light of the circumstances, to
indicate that the defendant does not sincerely hold the beliefs pro-
fessed. 103 Since minor deviations from religious guidelines are com-
mon among many who are still generally considered to be believers,' °4
courts should give little, if any, weight to evidence of a less than sub-
stantial disregard of religious principles.
B. Adverse Consequences of Religious Belief
A person who has submitted to great hardship rather than deviate
from a professed religious doctrine is unlikely to be feigning belief. 05
100. Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 89-90; Fromer v. Scully, 649 F. Supp. 512, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 817 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1987); Leahy v. District Court, 646 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D.D.C.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
101. See Note, Role of Church and State, supra note 43, at 84 n.61 (arguing that compari-
sons of declared belief and actual behavior are inaccurate for recent converts who disavow past
actions); see also Note, Burdens on Free Exercise, supra note 56, at 1272 n.82 (advancing the
same proposition).
102. See Lupu, supra note 65, at 954; see also Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.
2d 232, 163 P.2d 704 (1945) (Carter, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 331 U.S. 543 (1947). In
his dissent, Justice Carter stated:
Religionists and reformers are often called from the gutter whence they return to make
expiation for their wrongdoings by trying to save others from a like fate and to aid the
redemption of those who may already have strayed. Forceful and effective work has
been done by the reformed, turned reformer, and many of these people labor on with-
out affiliation with any recognized institution and without financial help other than
that gleaned through solicitation.
Id. at 270, 163 P.2d at 725. However, where the "sins of the past" include prior instances of
religious fraud, relevance outweighs the risk of prejudice and such evidence generally should be
admitted. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
103. In one case, a high school teacher sued the school board for docking his pay when he
did not work on claimed holy days. The school board argued that because the teacher had
worked on some of the holy days, his beliefs were not sincerely held. The trial court held that the
financial pressure imposed by the school's docking the teacher's pay was sufficient to rebut any
inference of insincerity. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 749 U.S. 60 (1986); see also Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186, 1195-96 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
104. Examples include occasional deviation from observance of the Sabbath or a kosher diet.
Heins, supra note 30, at 185-86; Note, Constitutional Definition of Religion, supra note 99, at
1081 n.123.
105. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black, and
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Similarly, finding insincerity in beliefs which require a relatively spar-
tan lifestyle and impose rigid requirements on adherents would be dif-
ficult. °6 However, prosecution for fraud is not likely in this context
since personal hardship would probably not figure prominently in
fraud schemes. Dodger's goal is avoidance of hardship through the
financial gains of his religious enterprise. Evidence of hardship is per-
suasive only where the claimant willfully chose subjection to the hard-
ship and has accepted the hardship as a cost of being faithful to the
belief.
Even if the defendant can show that certain acts were committed
with a recognized risk of prosecution, it remains difficult to determine
whether conscious exposure to prosecution is a "sincere act of con-
science . or a calculated decision to risk occasional punishment as a
cost of engaging in a highly profitable, and fraudulent, conduct."'' 7
Where motivation is unclear, the length and extent of the hardship
may be balanced against personal gain to determine whether calcu-
lated risk or sincere sacrifice motivated the behavior.
C. Alternative Secular Purpose
A common charge against alleged religious frauds is that the chal-
lenged acts do not arise from sincere religious belief, but rather are
motivated by an alternative secular purpose.108 The alternative pur-
Douglas, JJ., concurring); Leahy v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D.D.C.
1986), rev'don other grounds, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 125
N.W.2d 588, 590 (1963); see also Heins, supra note 30, at 186-87 (cautioning against relying
solely on this inquiry).
106. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 442
(2d Cir. 1981) (noting the materially sparse lifestyles of Krishna devotees); United States v. Ka-
hane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (regarding a suit by the Rabbi Meier Kahane, now
the leader of a radical political party in Israel, for a strict kosher diet which would be "repeti-
tious and spartan" under prison conditions).
107. Barber, 650 F.2d at 442.
108. "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation ... if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protec-
tion of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief." Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
Alternative purposes identified in case law include: (1) Tax evasion: Mason v. General Brown
Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Marriage of Hoyt, 742 P.2d 963, 964
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Ideal Life Church of Lake Elmo v. County of Washington, 304 N.W.2d
308, 318 (Minn. 1981) (Wahl, J., concurring); Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d 512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982); (2)
Special prison privileges: Loney v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979); Theriault v.
Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); (3) Intent to injure another's reputation: Hester v. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); (4) Scientific or philosophical views: Sherr v. Northport-
East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); (5) Sex: Han-
sel v. Purnell, 1 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924); (6) Desire to circumvent
the drug laws: United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968).
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pose which should figure prominently in any religious fraud case is
personal monetary gain through deception or fraud.'09 The extent to
which the defendant and his organization are devoted to fundraising
rather than to other matters,"0 the amount of funds raised, and the
amount of money used primarily for the personal benefit of the
defendant"' are all relevant to whether the defendant is motivated by
personal gain." 2 Therefore, if Dodger were prosecuted, the amount of
money siphoned off to support his lifestyle would be important evi-
dence of his alternative secular purpose.
D. Size and History of the Religious Organization
Courts occasionally refer to the size and history of the faith in order
to ascertain the sincerity of an individual adherent."' Information
109. Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984); In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr.
848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), aff'd, 81 Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
Much of the testimony in the Jim Bakker trial was directed toward showing that Bakker's
motive arose from avarice rather than faith. The prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney,
in his opening statement, said: "The motive was money. The motive was opulence. The motive
was a lavish lifestyle most of you will not be able to identify with." Orrick, Bakker's motive
money, court told, Tampa Tribune, Aug. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Evidence of the financial
motive included reports of complaints by Bakker that he did not live as opulently as other tele-
vangelists, and reports of his fleet of expensive automobiles and collection of homes. Baniskey,
Testimony in Bakker's trial focuses on lavish lifestyle, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 30, 1989, at
A3, col. 2. Witnesses testified about various incidents illustrative of Bakker's obsession with
money, such as confessions of fearing poverty and dreaming about wealth. The jury also heard
testimony that Bakker raised the rent of his octogenarian parents, who lived at the PTL theme
park, Heritage USA. Orrick, Ex-aide describes Bakker's expensive exploits to court, Tampa
Tribune, Aug. 30, 1989, at A4, col. 1.




B. Buy more money made with allocations for expense (bean theory).
3. MAKE MONEY.
K. MAKE MORE MONEY.
L. MAKE OTHER PEOPLE PRODUCE SO AS TO MAKE MONEY.
A small sack of beans will produce a whole field of beans. Allocate only with that in
mind and demand money be made.
Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 422 (1985), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1752 (1988).
During his tenure at PTL, Jim Bakker apparently paid close attention to and kept personal
records of each day's receipts. Orrick, supra note 109, at Al, col. 1.
111. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112. At least one commentator has argued that gross earnings of a religion should not be
considered, on the unpersuasive ground that the "hierarchy of Catholicism or Christian Sci-
ence" would disapprove. Heins, supra note 30, at 181. The Catholic church has not been im-
mune from occurrences of fraud. See Turley, supra note 8, at 461 (discussing the Pallotine
scandal).
113. See Mason v. General Brown Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1988);
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about the defendant's religious group will ordinarily be presented to
the jury because it is relevant to a number of issues' 4 and is probably
necessary if the jury is to have an appropriate understanding of the
case. However, inferring insincerity from a religious group's size and
history appears constitutionally unsound; such an inference would be
detrimental to newer religious organizations which lack the pedigree
of more traditional religious groups." 5 Therefore, the trial court may
deem it necessary to caution the jury that new and unorthodox reli-
gious beliefs must be given the same constitutional protection as the
more traditional faiths and that the jury should in no way infer guilt
from the fact that the religion was established by the defendant, or
that the faith has few adherents.
E. Extent of Parallel Between Challenged Beliefs and Traditional
Religious Beliefs
Some courts have suggested that where the beliefs claimed are far
removed from traditional notions of religious belief, such claims
could not possibly be held in good faith and therefore merit no first
amendment protection. For example, Chief Justice Burger stated in
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division"6 that "[o]ne can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to
protection under the Free Exercise Clause . ... 11117 The factfinder
probably should have some power to infer insincerity from absurdly
ridiculous claims." 8 However, such power carries some of the same
Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 259-60 (W.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (hold-
ing that the Amish have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their beliefs by three centu-
ries of existence as an identifiable religious sect).
114. Such information might include, for example, organizational plans demonstrating the
means by which the act was perpetrated. Also, the prosecution may include conspiracy counts;
evidence concerning the co-conspirators, who will likely be other members of the religious
group, should be allowed in order to show the conspiracy.
115. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over an-
other."); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at § 14-12.
116. 450U.S. 707 (1981).
117. Id. at 715.
118. For example, in Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 589
F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979), the plaintiff claimed his religious creed required its adherents to eat
cat food. Judge King refused to accept that this claim was made in good faith.
In United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968), one of the organization's
official church hymns was "Row, Row, Row Your Boat," and the church motto was "Victory
over Horseshit!" The church catechism, in the words of the court, was "full of goofy non-
sense. "
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risks as the previous category of evidence, i.e., bias against newer and
unorthodox faiths.'19 Unless the principles under consideration are
pervasively silly in the extreme, 120 the court should caution the jury to
avoid bias against the defendant simply because his claimed beliefs are
unique.
F. Devotion and Intensity of Claimant's Faith
Where the defendant can demonstrate rigid devotion to his faith,
his belief is more likely to be sincerely held. 12' For example, testimony
that the defendant's conversation revolved primarily around religious
themes, that he would commonly engage in lengthy prayer sessions, or
that he would fast two days of each week indicates sincere religious
belief.12 2
Such evidence of sincerity (subject, of course, to a rebuttal by the
prosecution that the activities were all part of the scheme to defraud)
may be helpful for the defendant, but it would be improper for the
prosecutor to introduce evidence that the defendant did not practice
his beliefs with constant zeal. Such an approach would be analogous
to holding that occasional churchgoers are not worthy of constitu-
tional protection. 123 Consequently, the intensity of the defendant's be-
lief is an irrelevant inquiry. 124 The religious fraud defendant, if he is to
be constitutionally convicted, must be distinguished from one who is
groping for, but not yet certain of, religious truth. 125
119. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
120. Both Brown, 441 F. Supp. at 1382, and Kuch, 288 F. Supp. at 439, meet the "perva-
sively silly" test. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
121. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d
Cir. 1981); Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 96-97
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 105-07 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976).
122. See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 96 ("The Levys' conception of human existence and the
physical world seems to pervade their whole way of life, including their eating habits and meth-
ods of combatting illness .... ").
123. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice
Jackson stated:
And then I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious represen-
tation amounts to actionable fraud. James points out that "Faith means belief in
something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible." . . . It is hard in
matters so mystical to say literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and
even more difficult to say how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal belief which
induces followers to give him money.
Id. (quoting WtLLs JAmEs, The Will to Believe, in COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEws 90 (1920)).
124. Weiss, supra note 40, at 600.
125. Id.
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G. Statements and Testimony of the Defendant
Statements of the defendant, both in and out of court, will gener-
ally be among the evidence considered. While the defendant's testi-
mony concerning the sincerity of his beliefs should be given great
weight, 26 the factfinder need not shrink from the possibility that this
testimony is self-serving. Admissions by the defendant on the stand
are rare, but may occur.1 27 The defendant's demeanor during testi-
mony will also be important in considering the weight to be given his
testimony. 128
Out-of-court statements which indicate lack of sincerity will often
constitute the state's most convincing evidence. Also, the co-conspira-
tor's admission rule1 29 should permit into evidence statements by
members of the defendant's organization which might cast doubt on
the defendant's sincerity or indicate a secular motive.'30
H. Whether the Challenged Tenet is Part of an Organized Faith To
Which the Defendant Belongs
The Supreme Court recently indicated that sincerity may be easily
found where the challenged tenet is part of an established religion to
which the claimant belongs.'3 ' However, this case and others relying
126. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). It has been argued that the threat of
perjury serves as a helpful deterrent to fraudulent claims for religious exemptions. Note, Consti-
tutional Definition of Religion, supra note 99, at 1081. This argument is weaker but still applica-
ble in the case of a criminal defendant, who has much more to risk than a civil defendant. Even
in a civil case, the court may determine that religious figures are testifying less than honestly.
See, e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr. 848, 857 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (finding the testi-
mony of Pastor Carl Stevens "evasive and lacking in credibility" and in conflict with "undis-
puted documentary evidence."), aff'd, 81 Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
127. E.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 96
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant admitted he joined the religious group solely to gain a tax exemp-
tion).
128. See Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984); The Bible Speaks, 73 Bankr.
at 857. United States Bankruptcy Judge Rufus W. Reynolds said of Jim Bakker's testimony in
court: "I could not believe anything he said.... He was contradicted 50-75 times by concrete
evidence." Blum, Bakkers Blasted, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 2, col. 1.
129. FED. R. EvtD. 801(d)(2)(E)
130. In Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969), Judge Skelly Wright noted that early Scientology literature
indicated that the movement's increasingly religious orientation disturbed some of its members,
who argued that the shifting orientation was merely an attempt to pull a legal cloak over the
group's activities.
131. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (1989). Writing for
the majority, Justice White stated:
Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination, especially one with
a specific tenet forbidding members to work on Sunday, would simplify the problem
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on this type of evidence were civil cases involving claims for religion-
based exemptions. 13 2 This type of evidence would seem less persuasive
in the religious fraud context, since the defrauder could as easily
choose to adopt a traditional denomination as invent a theology.
Fraudulent schemes such as the one Dodger plans can take place in
traditional as well as newer religions; therefore, the question of tenet
orthodoxy does not seem particularly relevant to the issue of whether
a criminal defendant's religious claims are sincere. Indeed, the success
of Dodger's pitch may well depend on its resemblence to a popular
mainstream faith.
L Coexistence of Secular Fraud
A very strong case for insincerity exists where the evidence demon-
strates that the defendant has also engaged in secular misrepresenta-
tions in the religious context.' When the defendant has lied about
matters other than his religious beliefs, it appears more likely that he
is misrepresenting these claims as well. 3 4 For example, evidence might
include false claims of having authored various publications,'35 false
promises as to the use of solicited funds,'3 6 and false representations
of personal history, including birth,137 education, 3 ' and wealth. 13 9 In
the trial against James Bakker,' 4° a former advertising copywriter for
PTL testified about a desktop statue offered on the PTL television
program as a bonus to lure $1,000 contributions. 14' According to the
of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a
particular religious organization.
Id. at 1517.
132. See id.; Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
133. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant told his followers
that church funds came from foreign investments, when in fact they were the proceeds of an
ongoing Ponzi scheme), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
134. E.g., New v. United States, 245 F. 710, 713 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665
(1917).
135. Seeid. at 716.
136. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
137. See United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512, 513 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 817 (1946).
138. See id.; see also Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 229, 644
P.2d 577, 594 (Ct. App. 1982) (complaint charged that L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the
Scientology movement, falsely claimed to be an engineer and physicist with degrees from Prince-
ton University, Sequoia University, and George Washington University), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983).
139. See Carruthers, 152 F.2d at 513.
140. United States v. Bakker, Case No. 88-205 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
141. Orrick, Ex-aide describes Bakker's expensive exploits to court, Tampa Tribune, Aug.
30, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
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copywriter, viewers were told, "[many feel that if you were to pur-
chase the David and Goliath Sculpture ... it would cost over $1,000"
when, in fact, PTL paid about $10 each for the statues. 42
In one situation, however, an inference of insincerity from the coex-
istence of secular fraud would not be warranted. In the recent case of
Molko v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Chris-
tianity, 43 the defendant members of the Unification Church argued
that their secular misrepresentations were motivated by a belief in the
doctrine of "Heavenly Deception" 1" and that they had lied in order
to give others "the opportunity to hear Reverend Moon's teach-
ings. ' 14  Although the lies concerned secular matters, they were
rooted in sincere religious belief and thus protected by the first
amendment.'" No inference of insincerity may arise where secular
misrepresentations are motivated by sincere religious belief.
J. Reference to Case Law
When examining the issue of sincerity, courts have looked to case
law involving the religious organization, 147 the defendant, 4 and, to a
lesser extent, the particular belief. 49 Previous litigation involving the
religious organization or defendant which disclosed evidence of fraud
or insincerity indicates that insincerity may still be present. Although
one previously involved in religious fraud may have been converted to
sincere belief, prior fraud will still constitute strong evidence of an
insincere state of mind, particularly if the prior occurrence involved
similar claims and practices. 150
142. Id. The statues were hollow and made of pseudo-pewter. As the Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney prepared to hand one to the jury, "the sword fell from tiny David's hand." Id. at A4, col.
3.
143. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2110
(1989).
144. Id. at 1114-15, 762 P.2d at 58, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Mason v. General Brown Cent. School Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1988);
Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers' Money in the Bureau of
Prisons, 620 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981); Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1143 (D. Mass. 1982).
148. See Church of the New Song, 620 F.2d at 653; Hansel v. Purnell, I F.2d 266, 273 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 617 (1924).
149. See Leahy v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
150. Cf. Purnell, I F.2d at 273 (holding defendant's previous prosecution for debauchery
within a claimed religious group relevant to sincerity of his beliefs when his cult committed
similar acts).
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K. Evidence of Concealment
A strong inference of fraud arises where the defendants are shown
to have concealed material facts from their alleged victims. 5' Such
concealment may be demonstrated in a variety of ways, including evi-
dence of falsified documents,'5 2 evidence that the defendant com-
monly violated his religious teachings but concealed this fact from his
followers,' or evidence that expenditures of church funds were con-
cealed from church members. For example, the higher echelon of the
PTL Club maintained a separate, confidential bank account for the
payment of the top executive officers so that none of the employees or
contributors to PTL would know of the enormous sums of money
being disbursed to the church leadership. 5 4 Evidence used in the Bak-
ker trial included testimony concerning the defendant's destruction of
potentially incriminating documents,' as well as the use of internal
memos demonstrating calculated attempts to conceal ministry fi-
nances.156
Similarly, other attempts by the defendant to avoid legal liability
are indicative of bad faith dealings. In one case, the defendants made
claims of divine monetary increases as a cover for a Ponzi scheme., 7
The court found it relevant that the ministers were instructed not to
use words which carry legal consequences, such as "promise," "guar-
antee," "investment," or "security."' 58 Such obvious attempts to
avoid legal liability indicate that religious concerns probably were not
the defendant's primary motivation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Those who attempt to use religion as a cloak to protect themselves
from liability for criminal activities should not go unpunished. At the
same time, great care must be exercised to insure that sincere believers
are not prosecuted for legitimate religious practices.
151. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1157 (1982).
152. Cf. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1222 (2d Cir. 1983) (tax evasion
case), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
153. See New v. United States, 245 F. 710, 717 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 665 (1917).
154. In re Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 92 Bankr. 1000, 1006-07
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988).
155. Orrick, Witness collapses in Bakker trial; plea for mistrial expected, Tampa Tribune,
Aug. 31, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
156. Patterson, Dortch gets 8 years in PTL case, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at A7,
col. 1.
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This Article has attempted to demonstrate one way that this variety
of crime may be prosecuted. The factfinder must focus on the ques-
tion of the defendant's sincerity. Some of the types of evidence which
may help on this point have been discussed. At the same time, risks
that prosecution might violate fundamental constitutional rights must
be minimized by careful attention to trial procedure. These protec-
tions are vital, yet are not so demanding as to effectively block prose-
cution of the Reverend Dodger. While our national conscience should
not tolerate the risk that even one sincere religious practitioner may
have been erroneously convicted, an outright ban on such prosecu-
tions is unnecessary. The societal costs of such a ban would be im-
measurable and inevitable. Religious fraud can and should be
prosecuted.
Finally, it seems appropriate to close with the sentiments of the
Honorable Rufus W. Reynolds, United States Bankruptcy Judge, who
presided over the bankruptcy proceedings of the PTL Club:
In conforming with the religious overtones of this case, this Court
observes that James Bakker either overlooked or ignored parts of the
Bible including I Timothy 6:10-"For the love of money is the root
of all evil: which while some coveted after, they have erred from the
faith and pierced themselves through with many sorrows." Now,
however, we must apply Galatians 6:7-"Be not deceived; God is
not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also
reap." 59
159. In re Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship, Inc., 92 Bankr. 1000, 1022
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (quoting 1 Timothy 6:10 and Galatians 6:7 (King James)).
